原爆神話の原典資料

アメリカ兵を救うために原爆を使用したというアメリカの立場は、今考えると不動のように思えますが、当時はアメリカ国内でも原爆使用の批判は大きかったようです。1947年2月に原爆使用の正当化を訴える必要から元陸軍長官スティムソが“The
Decision
to
Use
the
Bomb”
を雑誌ハーパーズに発表したということです。

（アメリカンヘリテージ）
Stimson, Henry Lewis 1867-1950.
American public official who served as US secretary of war (1911-1913 and 1940-1945), as governor-general of the Philippines (1927-1929), and as US secretary of state (1929-1933). He was the chief adviser on atomic weaponry to Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.

(Wikipedia)
ヘンリー・ルイス・スティムソン（Henry Lewis Stimson, 1867年9月21日 - 1950年10月20日）は、陸軍長官、フィリピン総督および国務長官を務めたアメリカの政治家である。保守的な共和党員であり、ニューヨーク市の弁護士でもあった。
スティムソンは、ナチス党政権下のドイツに対する攻撃的な姿勢のために、陸軍とその一部である陸軍航空軍の責任者に選ばれ、第二次世界大戦期における民間人出身の陸軍長官として最もよく知られている。1,200万人の陸軍兵と航空兵の動員と訓練、国家工業生産の30％の物資の購買と戦場への輸送、日系人の強制収容の推進、また原子爆弾の製造と使用の決断を管理した。

*******
原子爆弾への関与[編集]
スティムソンは原子爆弾に関して、マンハッタン計画の長レズリー・グローヴズ准将を監督し、原爆投下決定を検討したとされる「暫定委員会」の委員長を務めていた。ルーズヴェルトと後任のトルーマンは共に、原子爆弾のあらゆる局面で彼の助言に従った。そして必要とされるときスティムソンは軍の意見を却下した。 例えばスティムソンの頭越しでグローヴズから受け取った原爆投下の目標リストのうち、文化の中心都市であるとして京都への投下に強硬に反対しリストから外させた。1945年8月6日、最初の原子爆弾の攻撃が広島を破壊した。戦後には、原爆投下に対する批判を抑えるための「原爆神話」を生み出した。
スティムソンは、原爆投下に対する批判を抑えるために、「原爆投下によって、戦争を早く終わらせ、100万人のアメリカ兵の生命が救われた」と表明（1947年2月）[8]。 これが原爆使用正当化の定説となった。

“The
Decision
to
Use
the
Bomb”
は下記リンクで全文を読むことができます。この記事の最後に著作権フリーの注意書きが追加されていることからも関心が非常に高かったであろうことがうかがえます。

“The
Decision
to
Use
the
Bomb”

In
 view
 of
 the
 exceptional
 public
 importance
 of
 this
 article,
 permission
 is
 given
 to
 any
 newspaper
 or
 magazine
to
reprint
it,
in
part
or
(preferably,
since
its
effect
is
cumulative)
in
full,
with
credit
to
Harper’s
 Magazine
but
without
charge.

—
The
Editors

当時の記事を載せる前にIntroductionがあるのですが、そこにThe piece was intended as a response to mounting public criticism of the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan, including from highly respected public figures such as Albert Einstein.（この論考は日本に核兵器を使用した決定に対する国民の批判が高まっていることに対処する目的で書かれた。批判する中にはアインシュタインなどの著名人も含まれていた）とあることからも当時は原爆使用に大きな非難があったことがわかります。

Introduction

The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945) remains among the most controversial events in modern history. Historians have actively debated whether the bombings were necessary, what effect they had on bringing the war in the Pacific to an expeditious end, and what other options were available to the United States. These very same questions were also contentious at the time, as American policymakers struggled with how to use a phenomenally powerful new technology and what the long-term impact of atomic weaponry might be, not just on the Japanese, but on domestic politics, America’s international relations, and the budding Cold War with the Soviet Union. In retrospect, it is clear that the reasons for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan, just like the later impact of nuclear technology on world politics, were complex and intertwined with a variety of issues that went far beyond the simple goal of bringing World War II to a rapid close.
Former Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson’s article “The Decision to Use the Bomb” appeared in Harper’s Magazine in February 1947. The piece was intended as a response to mounting public criticism of the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan, including from highly respected public figures such as Albert Einstein.

10ページに及ぶTIMEのカバーストーリーよりも少し長めの記事です。原爆の開発から日本への作戦など丁寧に説明しています。以下の抜粋は、日本の本土上陸作戦について述べているところで、I
 was
 informed
 that
 such
 operations
 might
 be
 expected
 to
 cost
 over
 a
 million
 casualties,
 to
 American
 forces
 alone.ともし上陸したら米軍だけで百万人の戦死者が出ただろうと見積もっています。

The
strategic
plans
of
our
armed
forces
for
the
defeat
of
Japan,
as
they
stood
in
July,
had
 been
 prepared
 without
 reliance
 upon
 the
 atomic
 bomb,
 which
 had
 not
 yet
 been
 tested
 in
 New
 Mexico.
We
were
planning
an
intensified
sea
and
air
blockade,
and
greatly
intensified
strategic
 air
bombing,
through
the
summer
and
early
fall,
to
be
followed
on
November
1
by
an
invasion
 of
 the
 southern
 island
 of
 Kyushu.
 This
 would
 be
 followed
 in
 turn
 by
 an
 invasion
 of
 the
 main
 island
 of
 Honshu
 in
 the
 spring
 of
 1946.
 The
 total
 U.S.
 military
 and
 naval
 force
 involved
 in
 this
 grand
design
was
of
the
order
of
5,000,000
men;
if
all
those
indirectly
concerned
are
included,
it
 was
larger
still.

We
 estimated
 that
 if
 we
 should
 be
 forced
 to
 carry
 this
 plan
 to
 its
 conclusion,
 the
 major
 fighting
 would
 not
 end
 until
 the
 latter
 part
 of
 1946,
 at
 the
 earliest.
 I
 was
 informed
 that
 such
 operations
 might
 be
 expected
 to
 cost
 over
 a
 million
 casualties,
 to
 American
 forces
 alone.
 Additional
 large
 losses
 might
 be
 expected
 among
 our
 allies,
 and,
 of
 course,
 if
 our
 campaign
 were
successful
and
if
we
could
judge
by
previous
experience,
enemy
casualties
would
be
much
 larger
than
our
own.

It
 was
 already
 clear
 in
 July
 that
 even
 before
 the
 invasion
 we
 should
 be
 able
 to
 inflict
 enormously
 severe
 damage
 on
 the
 Japanese
 homeland
 by
 the
 combined
 application
 of
 “conventional”
 sea
 and
 air
 power.
 The
 critical
 question
 was
 whether
 this
 kind
 of
 action
 would
 induce
surrender.
It
therefore
became
necessary
to
consider
very
carefully
the
probable
state
of
 mind
 of
 the
 enemy,
 and
 to
 asses
 the
 accuracy
 the
 line
 of
 conduct
 which
 might
 end
 his
 will
 to
 resist.


このあたりはどのように見積もったのかが気になるところですが、Wikipediaは以下のような説明があります。

（ハーパーズ・マガジン，「原爆投下の決定」， 米国内の道義的批判をかわすためにジェームス・コナントが依頼，100万人の根拠は特になく話の成り行きであった，その後原爆神話に発展，1947.5 リーダーズダイジェスト日本語版に転載）

次は、京都が対象から外され、広島と長崎が選ばれたことについて触れているところです。広島と長崎とも軍都であると説明されると仕方がないか、という流れになりやすいですね。。。

Because
 of
 the
 importance
 of
 the
 atomic
 mission
 against
 Japan,
 the
 detailed
 plans
 were
 brought
 to
 me
 by
 the
 military
 staff
 for
 approval.
 With
 President
 Truman’s
 warm
 support
 I
 struck
off
the
list
of
suggested
target
mine.
We
determined
the
city
of
Kyoto.
Although
it
was
a
 target
 of
 considerable
 military
 importance,
 it
 had
 been
 the
 ancient
 capital
 of
 Japan
 and
 was
 a
 shrine
 of
 Japanese
 art
 and
 culture.
 We
 determined
 that
 it
 should
 be
 spared.
 I
 approved
 four
 other
targets
including
the
cities
of
Hiroshima
and
Nagasaki.

Hiroshima
was
bombed
on
August
6,
and
Nagasaki
on
August
9.
These
two
cities
were
 active
 working
 parts
 of
 the
 Japanese
 war
 effort.
 One
 was
 an
 army
 center;
 the
 other
 was
 naval
 and
 industrial.
 Hiroshima
 was
 the
 headquarters
 of
 the
 Japanese
 Army
 defending
 southern
 Japan
and
was
a
major
military
storage
and
assembly
point.
Nagasaki
was
a
major
seaport
and
 it
 contained
 several
 large
 industrial
 plants
 of
 great
 wartime
 importance.
 We
 believed
 that
 our
 attacks
 had
 struck
 cities
 which
 must
 certainly
 be
 important
 to
 the
 Japanese
 military
 leaders,
 both
Army
and
Navy,
and
we
waited
for
a
result.
We
waited
one
day.


長い記事なので全部読むのは大変ですので、主張全体をコンパクトにまとめたA
Personal
Summary
だけを読むのがいいかもしれません。最後の部分だけを抜粋します。素早く、被害を最小に抑えるための選択肢が原爆使用であったことを訴えかけています。

In
order
to
end
the
war
in
the
shortest
possible
time
and
to
avoid
the
enormous
losses
of
 human
 life
 which
 otherwise
 confronted
 us,
 I
 felt
 that
 we
 must
 use
 the
 Emperor
 as
 our
 instrument
 to
 command
 and
 compel
 his
 people
 to
 cease
 fighting
 and
 subject
 themselves
 to
 our
 authority
 through
 him,
 and
 that
 to
 accomplish
 this
 we
 must
 give
 him
 and
 his
 controlling
 advisers
 a
 compelling
 reason
 to
 accede
 to
 our
 demands.
 This
 reason
 furthermore
 must
 be
 of
 such
a
nature
that
his
people
could
understand
his
decision.
The
bomb
seemed
to
me
to
furnish
 a
unique
instrument
for
that
purpose.

My
chief
purpose
was
to
end
the
war
in
victory
with
the
least
possible
cost
in
the
lives
of
 the
men
in
the
armies
which
I
had
helped
to
raise.
In
the
light
of
the
alternatives
which,
on
a
fair
 estimate,
 were
 open
 to
 us
 I
 believe
 that
 no
 man
 in
 our
 position
 and
 subject
 to
 our
 responsibilities,
 holding
 in
 his
 hands
 a
 weapon
 of
 such
 possibilities
 for
 accomplishing
 this
 purpose
 and
 saving
 those
 lives,
 could
 have
 failed
 to
 use
 it
 and
 afterwards
 looked
 his
 countrymen
in
the
face.



As
I
read
over
what
I
have
written
I
am
aware
that
much
of
it,
in
this
year
of
peace,
may
 have
a
harsh
and
unfeeling
sound.
It
would
perhaps
be
possible
to
say
the
same
things
and
say
 them
more
gently.
But
I
do
not
think
it
would
be
wise.
As
I
look
back
over
the
five
years
of
my
 service
 as
 Secretary
 of
 War,
 I
 see
 too
 many
 stern
 and
 heartrending
 decision
 to
 be
 willing
 to
 pretend
that
war
is
anything
else
than
what
it
is.
The
face
of
war
is
the
face
of
death;
death
is
an
 inevitable
part
of
every
order
that
a
wartime
leader
gives.
The
decision
to
use
the
atomic
bomb
 was
 a
 decision
 that
 brought
 death
 to
 over
 a
 hundred
 thousand
 Japanese.
 No
 explanation
 can
 change
that
fact
and
I
do
not
wish
to
gloss
over
it.
But
this
deliberate,
premeditated
destruction
 was
 our
 least
 abhorrent
 choice.
 The
 destruction
 of
 Hiroshima
 and
 Nagasaki
 put
 an
 end
 to
 the
 Japanese
war.
It
stopped
the
fire
raids,
and
the
strangling
blockade;
it
ended
the
ghastly
specter
 of
a
clash
of
great
land
armies.

In
 this
 last
 great
 action
 of
 the
 Second
 World
 War
 we
 were
 given
 final
 proof
 that
 war
 is
 death.
War
in
the
twentieth
century
has
grown
steadily
more
barbarous,
more
destructive,
more
 debased
 in
 all
 its
 aspects.
 Now,
 with
 the
 release
 of
 atomic
 energy,
 man’s
 ability
 to
 destroy
 himself
is
nearly
complete.
The
bombs
dropped
on
Hiroshima
and
Nagasaki
ended
a
war.
They
 also
 made
 it
 wholly
 clear
 that
 we
 must
 never
 have
 another
 war.
 This
 is
 the
 lesson
 man
 and
 leaders
 everywhere
 must
 learn,
 and
 I
 believe
 that
 when
 they
 learn
 it
 they
 will
 find
 a
 way
 to
 lasting
peace.
There
is
no
other
choice.


現在はFOX Newsの人たちは議論の余地のない自明の主張のように語っていますが、この記事を実際読んでみると、慎重に書かれていて、ギリギリの決断であったことを理解してもらうように書かれています。だからといって原爆は正当化されたとは思えないのは、自分が日本人だからでしょうか。。。