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MBZとMBS - New Yorkerの読み応え

先週のTIMEとNew Yorkerはどちらもサウジアラビアの皇太子を特集していました。

TIMEの記事もよくまとまっていたとは思いますが、中東関連で著名なジャーナリストのDexter FilkinsのNew Yorkerの記事の方が圧倒的に読み応えがありました。

By Karl Vick | Photographs by Martin Schoeller for TIME
April 5, 2018


In his work with the White House, is Mohammed bin Salman driving out extremism, or merely seizing power for himself?
By Dexter Filkins


More important, M.B.Z. saw M.B.S. as a younger version of himself: smart, energetic, and eager to confront enemies. As M.B.S. was being groomed for power, the Gulf states were feeling increasingly vulnerable. When the Arab Spring erupted, in 2011, it forced out dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere. Leaders in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates were terrified that their monarchies would soon follow. The emergence of isis further alarmed them, and the two countries supported proxies to fight against its incursions in Syria and in Libya. But their most decisive intervention came in Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country, where the longtime strongman Hosni Mubarak was ousted by a popular uprising. In June, 2012, Egyptian voters delivered the Presidency to Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood. For the Saudis and the Emiratis, it was a nightmare.

The Brotherhood, founded in 1928, is the world’s largest Islamist movement, with hundreds of millions of followers. It has inspired Islamist political parties throughout the Sunni Muslim world, including branches in Jordan, Syria, and Bahrain. In Egypt, security services had savagely repressed the Brotherhood for decades. After the Arab Spring, though, it emerged as the country’s most organized political force.

“When Morsi got elected, the Saudis and the Emiratis went into overdrive,” a former senior American diplomat told me. According to several former American officials, M.B.Z. and Bandar bin Sultan, the director of Saudi intelligence, began plotting with others in their governments to remove Morsi from power. Egypt’s generals were already organizing against him. Bandar and M.B.Z. reached out to the Egyptian defense minister, General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and promised twenty billion dollars in economic aid if Morsi were deposed. (The Emirati Embassy did not respond to requests for comment.) They also began financing an anti-government movement in Cairo, built around an ostensibly independent youth group called Tamarod. As the coup took shape, Bandar and Sisi used Mohammed Dahlan, a Palestinian confidant, to carry messages and money to collaborators in the Egyptian military. The former diplomat said that the foreign support was crucial to the coup: “For Sisi to move like that, he needed a promise that he would succeed.” In July, 2013, the Egyptian military forced Morsi from power, and soon afterward it orchestrated a crackdown on suspected Brotherhood supporters, detaining at least forty thousand people. “It was terrible, terrible,” the diplomat told me. “What the Saudis and the Emiratis did was unforgivable.”

TIMEとNew Yorkerとの記事の違いもよくわかるので、New Yorkerという雑誌に興味がある方はまずTIMEの記事を読んでから下記のNew Yorkerの記事を読んでみてください。